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CORPORATE ALIENS AND OKLAHOMA'S
ALIEN LANDOWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the Economic Research Service of the United States De-
partment of Agriculture issued a report concerning the regulation of
alien landownership in the United States.' The authors of the report
suggested that the dearth of recent cases concerning enforcement of
state restrictions on alien landownership indicates one of several situa-
tions. "Either the statutes are so well known that they are customarily
obeyed, or they are so well forgotten or their continuing validity is sub-
ject to such question that there have been few efforts to enforce them,
even in clear cases." 2 The authors concluded that the latter reason
"would appear to be the more likely alternative."'3
In the wake of a recent opinion by the Attorney General of
Oklahoma4 this state has recently sought to enforce its alien land-
ownership legislation.5 In December 1979, Oklahoma Attorney Gen-
eral Jan Eric Cartwright filed escheat proceedings, pursuant to
Oklahoma's alien land statutes, in Oklahoma County District Court
against Hillcrest Investments, a Canadian corporation. 6 The Attorney
General sought divestiture of Hillcrest's landholdings in Oklahoma.
This case was recently decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.7 Suit
1. F. MORRISON & K. KRAUSE, STATE AND FEDERAL LEGAL REGULATION OF ALIEN AND
CORPORATE LAND OWNERSHIP AND FARM OPERATION (1975).
2. Id. at 24.
3. Id.
4. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 79-286 (1979) (deciding, inter alia, that corporations are persons
within the purview of the Oklahoma alien landownership statutes).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 121-127 (1971).
6. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Hillcrest Invs., No. 79-5599 (Okla. County Dist. Ct. Feb. 22,
1980), appeal docketed, No. 54906 (Okla. March 12, 1980).
7. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Hillcrest Invs., No. 54906 (Okla. March 10, 1981). In the
lower court, Oklahoma County District Judge Carmon C. Harris rejected Opinion 79-286 finding
"that the restriction on alien ownership contained in Article 22, Section 1, of the Oklahoma Con-
stitution, applied only to natural persons and not to corporations." Id. On appeal, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court decided that this interpretation was incorrect and held "that the drafters of the
Oklahoma Constitution meant to include corporations within the restrictions on alien ownership
provided for at Section 1 of Article 22." Id. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision
in favor of Hillcrest, however, by determining that "a foreign [alien] corporation, once it has
complied with the domestication procedures established under Oklahoma law, is, for the purposes
of restrictions on alien land ownership, a resident of the State--and thus no longer subject to the
restrictions of Article 22, Section 1, of the Oklahoma Constitution." Id. The dissent found this
1
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has also been filed in federal district court by the Oklahoma State
Chamber of Commerce and a business group, Oklahomans for Eco-
nomic Progress, seeking to have the recent opinion declared "violative
of the. . . Constitution and laws of the United States."
The recent decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hillcrest
effectively quiets title to millions of dollars of real estate in Oklahoma, 9
and may well stimulate future foreign investment in this state.' 0 Due to
the value of much Oklahoma real estate for purposes of oil and natural
gas production, this decision could have a profound effect on energy-
related alien investment in Oklahoma. 1 In Hillcrest, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court did not reach the complex issues the case potentially
raised, but rather decided it on a virtual technicality. This comment
describes the developments in Oklahoma which generated the litigation
and examines the issues left unresolved in Hillcrest.
II. THE OKLAHOMA RESTRICTIONS
Most states have either a constitutional provision or legislation
conclusion "unsupported by the law and logic" and remarked "It]his Canadian corporation is not
a bona fide resident of Oklahoma. It is-and always will be-an alien. Being domesticated to do
business in Oklahoma does not change its legal residence." Id. (Simms & Doolin, J.J., dissent-
ing). The State filed a motion for rehearing in the supreme court on March 30, 1981.
8. Chamber of Commerce v. Cartwright, No. 79-1287 (W.D. Okla. filed Dec. 6, 1979). On
April 9, 1980, this action was stayed pending final determination of the Hillcrest case by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. See generally C. WRmHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 218-19 (3d ed. 1976) (discussing the various abstention doctrines of the federal courts).
On August 27, 1980, both the Oklahoma State Chamber of Commerce and Oklahomans for Eco-
nomic Progress filed amicus curiae briefs with the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hilkcrest.
9. "The opinion [had] cast a cloud of uncertainty over millions of dollars worth of property
in Oklahoma owned by foreign-controlled corporations." Tulsa World, Sept. 18, 1979, at I, col. 3.
One reason the opinion was potentially so consequential is that if read in light of a 1979
Oklahoma Attorney General Report entitled "Non-Resident Alien Ownership of Land in
Oklahoma: Report of the Oklahoma Attorney General," title conveyed to a nonresident alien in
violation of the restrictive Oklahoma legislation automatically vested in the state without a judi-
cial proceeding. The report concludes that the Oklahoma legislation "would appear on its face to
render title to land conveyed in violation thereof void and not merely voidable. ... Opinion
79-286 also states "[t]itle to land which has been conveyed in violation of [the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion and Statutes] has eseheated to the State of Oklahoma." Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 79-286 (1979).
See OKLA. CONsT. art. 22, § 1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 121 (1971). See generally Barghols,Alien
Ownership of Oklahoma Urban Real Property, 50 OKLA. B.J. 2439 (1979) (discussing the issue of
title escheating ipso facto to the state).
10. See Canadians Concerned About Land Curb, Tulsa Tribune, Jan. 5, 1980, at 26, col. 3.
Oklahoma Governor Nigh had called for "quick actions through the courts or legislature ... to
avoid drying up foreign investments in the state." Oklahoma City Times, Sept. 20, 1979, at 1-2,
col. I.
11. See Mccoy, Canadians Have Keen Interest in Oklahoma, Tulsa Tribune, July 4, 1980, at
IF, col. I. "Ray Saadien a broker for Canarim Investment, claims Oklahoma is the 'hottest' state
in which Canadian companies may invest. 'There must be 100 Canadian companies in Oklahoma
that are exploring and developing oil in Oklahoma,' he said." Id.
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dealing with alien ownership of land. 12 Oklahoma was one of a few
states imposing somewhat comprehensive restrictions. 13  The
Oklahoma Constitution states that:
No alien or person who is not a citizen of the United States,
shall acquire title to or own land in this state, and the Legisla-
ture shall enact laws whereby all persons not citizens of the
United States, and their heirs, who may hereafter acquire real
estate in this state by devise, descent, or otherwise, shall dis-
pose of the same within five years upon condition of escheat
or forfeiture to the State. . . .
Several statutes incorporate the constitutional provision requiring:
that an alien who is not a resident of Oklahoma cannot ac-
quire land within the state and that when a resident alien who
is entitled to own land within the state lives outside the state
12. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1507, 1509-1512 (1976) (Alaska & Hawaii); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 34;
ALA. CODE § 35-1-1 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1201 to -1210 (1974) (repealed 1978);
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 20; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-301 (1971); CAL. CONST. OF 1879 art. I, § 20
(amended 1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 671 (West 1954); COLO. CONST. art. III, § 27; CONN. GEN,.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47-57 to -58 (West 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 306-308 (1974); D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. §§ 45-1501 to -1505 (West 1968); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; GA. CODE ANN. § 79-303
(1973); IDAHO CODE § 55-103 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1-9 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp.
1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-8-1 to -2 (Burns 1980); IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 22; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 567.1- .11 (west Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 381.290,
381.300 (1972); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1490 (west 1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 451
(1964); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-101 (1974); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 1 (West
1977); MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 5; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.135 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 500.221 (Supp. 1980); MIss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.560 (Vernon
Supp. 1980); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 1-1-109 (1979) (adopting English common law retric-
tions on alien landownership); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended 1920); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 111.055 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477.20 (1968), construedin Inre Estate of Constan, 118
N.H. 166, 384 A.2d 495 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-18 (west Supp. 1980); N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 22 (amended 1921); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-1 to
-5 (1965 & Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-01-11, 47-10.1-01 to -06 (1978 & Supp. 1979);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.16 (Baldwin 1978); OKLA CONST art. 22, § 1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,
§§ 121-127 (1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 273.255 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 22.24, 22.25-.32
(Purdon 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-2-1 (1969); S.C. CONST. art. III, § 35; S.C. CODE §§ 27-13-10
to -40 (1976); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 43-2-9, 43-2A-I to -7 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 64-201 (1976); TEX. Rev. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 166a (Vernon 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1
(1953) (common law adopted); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 66; VA. CODE § 55-1 (1974); WASH. CONST.
art. 2, § 33 (repealed 1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 64.16.010-.130, 64.16.150 (1966) (repealed
1967); id. § 64.16.140 (1966) (amended 1967); id. § 64.16.005 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 36-1-21
(1966); Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 15; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 710.01 to .02 (West 1980); WYO. CONST. art.
1, § 29; Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-15-101 to -103 (1977). See Sullivan, Alien Land Laws.- A Re-Eyalua-
tion, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15 (1962). See also Comment, Do We Live in Alen Nations?, 3 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J 75, 95-111 (1972).
13. OKLA STAT. tit. 60, §§ 121-127 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1973) (nonresident
aliens may hold land not longer than twenty years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-58 (West 1978)
(nonresident alien may hold land only for certain purposes).
14. OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § 1. This provision does not apply to Indians born in the United
States, Oklahoma resident aliens, and lands owned by aliens at the time the constitution was
enacted. Id.
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for a period of five years, any lands he owns will revert to the
state under proceedings instituted by the Attorney General or
County Attorney.' 5
The opinion that generated the Hillcrest litigation,' 6 states that the
word "person" as used in the Oklahoma Constitution 7 and in
Oklahoma's corresponding statutes' 8 "includes bodies corporate."' 9
Written by Assistant Attorney General John Paul Johnson, the opinion
is the latest of three recent state Attorney General Opinions interpret-
ing Oklahoma's alien landownership statutes.20
In 1975, then Attorney General Derryberry, pursuant to a request
from the Director of Oklahoma's Department of Industrial Develop-
ment, concluded that "a corporation or other entity may hold real es-
tate subject to the statutes regulating that particular type of entity but
upon the dissolution of such entity an alien individual may not acquire
title to said real estate."'2' This opinion, seemingly permitted corpora-
tions to own real estate in Oklahoma without regard to alienage of the
controlling persons or place of incorporation.
Next, in 1976, state representative Victor Wickersham asked At-
torney General Derryberry whether it was "legal for a foreign country
to acquire and hold property in the State of Oklahoma. ' 22 The Attor-
ney General's response interpreted the alien land laws in light of the
statutory provision that "[t]he word 'person,' except when used by way
of contrast, includes not only human beings, but bodies politic and
corporate. ' 23  Relying on this definition, the Attorney General con-
15. Note, Constitutional Law.- Are Oklahoma's Restrictions on Alien Ownershi of Land Con-
stitutional?, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 144, 145 (1979) (footnotes omitted) (summarizing the legislation)
[hereinafter cited as Oklahoma's Restrictions].
16. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 79-286 (1979). In Oklahoma, an Attorney General's Opinion is law
until overruled by a court. In Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections,
510 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1973), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that "it is the duty of public
officers. . . with notice thereof to follow the opinion of the Attorney General until relieved of
such duty by a Court of competent jurisdiction or until this Court should hold otherwise." Id. at
681. See also Note, Attorney General: The Effect of the Attorney General's Opinion in Oklahoma,
28 OKLA. L. REV. 106 (1975).
17. "No alien or person who is not a citizen of the United States, shall acquire title to or own
land in this state ...." OKLA. CONsT. art. 22, § 1.
18. "No alien or any person who is not a citizen of the United States shall acquire title to or
own land in the State of Oklahoma .. " OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 121 (1971).
19. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 79-286 (1979). "[Alnd such bodies do not avoid the provisions
thereof by obtaining articles of domestication to transact business in the State of Oklahoma." d.
It is on exactly this point that the Oklahoma Supreme Court reached a different conclusion.
20. Id.; 9 OKLA. Op. ATr'v GEN. 271 (1976); 7 OKLA. Op. ATr'e GEN. 189 (1974).
21. 7 OKLA. Op. AiT'y GEN. 189, 191 (1974).
22. 9 OKLA. Op. ATr'y GEM. 271, 272 (1976).
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 16 (1971).
1981]
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cluded that since "'person'. .. includes a body politic, a foreign coun-
try is, therefore, a 'person who is not a citizen of the United States' and
is an alien for the purposes of these statutes."24 This opinion dealt spe-
cifically with landownership by a foreign country. Nonetheless, be-
cause the statutory definition of persons includes both bodies politic
and corporate,25 the conclusion that corporations, like foreign
countries, are included in Oklahoma's restrictive legislation is almost
inescapable.
The most recent interpretation is again the result of a request from
the Director of Oklahoma's Department of Industrial Development.
The Director first asked whether an alien could hold title in fee simple
absolute to real property in Oklahoma. He also asked if the answer to
the first question would differ if the alien were a corporation. 26 Relying
on Attorney General Derryberry's rationale in the 1976 opinion,27 At-
torney General Jan Eric Cartwright concluded that alien corporations
could not hold title to real estate in Oklahoma, expressly withdrawing
an earlier opinion to the contrary.28
The Oklahoma Attorney General's opinion primarily concerns
corporations that have been incorporated outside the United States.
The opinion also considers landownership by a corporation incorpo-
rated in the United States but "controlled" by non-resident alien share-
holders.29 The opinion expressly states that it "does not consider the
status of title to land conveyed to a corporation which is controlled by
alien shareholders."3 Nonetheless, the opinion goes on to consider this
very situation.
It is axiomatic, however, that a person cannot accomplish a
purpose indirectly which is prohibited by law. Article 22, § 1,
expressly prohibits acquisition of Oklahoma land by an alien.
That prohibition cannot be avoided by indirectly acquiring
ownership through a corporate device or other legal entity.
Ownership embraces, in addition to legal title, all of the inci-
dents and rights constituent therein. The corporate form
cannot be utilized to shield one who has acquired such inci-
24. 9 OKLA. Op. Arr'y GEN. 271, 273 (1976).
25. Note 23 supra and accompanying text.
26. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 79-286 (1979).
27. Notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
28. "It is, therefore, the opinion of the Attorney General that Opinion 74-214, issued January
30, 1975, failed to address the questions submitted, and, accordingly should be and hereby is
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dents and rights in violation of the prohibition.3'
Oklahoma will, it appears, consider a corporation "alien", and within
the purview of its alien land restrictions, if it is either incorporated
under the laws of a foreign country or incorporated in the United
States and controlled by aliens.
This aspect of the opinion is likely impossible to enforce. The
impracticalities of tracing corporate ownership through various legal
devices could prove insurmountable.32 If the Oklahoma Supreme
Court had gone beyond where it did, this portion of the recent opinion
would have raised many complex legal issues. The following sections
will discuss the most prominent of these.
III. CORPORATE NATIONALITY
Because the applicability of the Oklahoma statutes depends upon
whether the corporation is an alien, a threshold question in enforce-
ment proceedings involves determination of corporate alienage.33 This
determination will depend upon the particular test the court adopts.
"What the question demands is a search for certain criteria which de-
termine whether a corporation is to be classified as either foreign [alien]
or domestic." 34
One such criterion is a corporation's place of incorporation.
Under this approach a corporation can be deemed a "national" of the
jurisdiction from which it obtained its charter.35 This is the least diffi-
31. Id. See OKLA. CONsT. art. 22, § 1.
32. If the nationality of shareholder test is used, [to ascertain corporate nationality] the
difficulty arises of tracing ownership and voting rights through trusts, companies, ar-
rangements and understandings. This process can be tortuous and will at the best of
times result in a rather large margin of error.
An additional difficulty is posed if a shareholder in a corporation which is under
examination is itself a corporation. In order to decide the nationality of the corporation
under review, it may be necessary to determine the nationality of the corporate share-
holder.
Tedeschi, The Determination of Corporate Nationality, 50 AUSTL. L.J. 521, 523 (1976). See also
Weisman, Restrictions on the Acquisition of Land by Aliens, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 52-53 (1980).
33. The term alien refers to a foreign-born resident who has not become a naturalized citizen.
See Breuer v. Beery, 194 Iowa 243, -, 189 N.W. 717, 718 (1922); Caparell v. Goodbody 132 N.J.
Eq. 559, -, 29 A.2d 563, 569 (1942). A corporation is not per se born nor can it become a citizen.
Thus, the concept of alienage as it regards individuals does not fit regarding corporations. The
phrase "corporate alienage" generally refers to whether the corporation has greater connections
with the forum country or with other nations. Tedeschi, supra note 32, at 526. The phrase "corpo-
rate nationality" refers to the particular nation with which the corporate alien has its greatest
contacts. This becomes important in deciding whether a corporate entity can claim particular
treaty rights.
34. Tedeschi, supra note 32, at 521.
35. See Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Case (United States v. Germany), Mixed
19811
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cult method of conferring alienage on a corporation.36 Under this test,
the corporate entity is a national of the jurisdiction in which it was
metaphorically born. For example, following this approach an enter-
prise incorporated in Delaware would be considered a United States
national although owned and controlled, perhaps exclusively, by aliens.
If place of incorporation is the sole factor considered when determining
corporate alienage, state restrictions on alien landownership can be eas-
ily evaded by alien-controlled corporations that choose to incorporate
in this country.
The Oklahoma Attorney General's 1979 opinion suggests that in
situations where the corporation is chartered in the United States but
"controlled" by alien shareholders, the alienage of the shareholders
will be conferred upon the corporation.37 Defining the basis for corpo-
rate nationality as alien control is, however, only an initial step in de-
termining corporate alienage. Shareownership is not necessarily
synonymous with control. Corporations, in their articles of incorpora-
tion, are usually authorized to issue one or more classes of stock.38 At-
Claims Commission (1939) (found in 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 833
(1943)); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 45-1502 (West 1968) (determining a corporation alien if not cre-
ated by or under the laws of the United States or of some state or territory of the United States);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.1(4) (West Supp. 1980) (defining the phrase "foreign business" to mean a
corporation incorporated under the laws of a foreign country); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-406 (1976)
(to own land a corporation must be incorporated under Nebraska law); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02
(West 1980) (determining a corporation alien if not created by or under the laws of the United
States or of some state or territory thereof). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 11, Comment 1 (1971) (the domicile of a corporation is always its state of incorporation).
36. This is the least sophisticated way of determining the nationality of a corporation, in
that it takes the concept of nationality of natural persons and applies it to the corporate
sphere by stating that a corporation, if "born" in a jurisdiction, becomes a subject there.
In this era of increased corporate mobility, the choice of the place of incorporation may
be purely a matter of convenience without any intention on the part of those who mani-
fest the corporate will to have any other connection with the jurisdiction of incorpora-
tion. The main advantage of this method is the ease with which it can be applied.
Tedeschi, supra note 32, at 521.
This approach is superficial since it contemplates matters of form and not of substance
(who possesses the true interest in the land acquired). It enables aliens to form compa-
nies which are not "foreign" and thereby to acquire the land they wish; in many coun-
tries this method has been adopted to by-pass the statutory restrictions, e.g., in Mexico
and Liberia.
Weisman, supra note 32, at 52. See also Vagts, The Corporate Alien. Definitonal Questions in
Federal Restraints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1526-30 (1961). In Hillcrest, the
court had no difficulty in determining corporate alienage. "An answer to the [corporate alienage
question] is easily ascertained .... It is well settled that corporations formed under the laws of
foreign nations are alien corporations." State ex rel Cartwright v. Hillcrest Invs., No. 54906
(Okla. March 10, 1981).
37. Note 31 supra and accompanying text.
38. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUsINESS ENTER-
PRISES, 207-14 (2d ed. 1970).
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tached to each class are certain rights respecting, for example,
dividends, liquidation preferences, and voting.39 Voting rights are usu-
ally held by the common shareholders and are perhaps the characteris-
tic of shareownership most equivalent to control.4" Thus, aliens could
hold a majority of stock in a particular corporation yet have little or no
"control" because their shares are nonvoting. The converse can also
occur where aliens hold a minority of stock yet because of voting and
other preferences they exert more control than citizen common share-
holders.4
A third test to determine corporate alienage involves "the extent of
capital which has been contributed by shareholders regardless of voting
rights."42 Under this test, if a majority of a corporation's equity securi-
ties are owned by nonresident aliens the corporation will be deemed an
alien. This method, however, does not include within the definition of
alien a corporation owned forty-nine percent by a single alien and fifty-
one percent by numerous United States citizens. In this situation, the
alien entity, in fact, holds a controlling interest but the corporation will
be classified as domestic. 43
39. Id. at 208-11.
40. Since the shareholders elect and can remove, in certain situations, the board of directors
who determine corporate policy and select the corporate officers, they arguably exert control over
the corporation through this franchise. Id. at 410. This argument is weakened, however, by the
fact that the directors are not agents of the shareholders and that after election their duty is owed
to the corporation rather than its shareholders. Id. at 415.
41. If the nationality of shareholders test is taken to mean the proportion of voting rights
exercised by shareholders, then the problem arises of defining just what is meant by the
right to exercise votes. In many companies the articles of association provide for
weighted voting whereby the holders of a particular class of shares (or even the holder of
one particular share) may be assigned extra voting powers. Indeed, the articles may
prohibit one class of shareholder from voting at general meetings at all. Such sharehold-
ers may be assigned the right to vote only at meetings of their class of shareholder.
Alternatively, the articles of association may state that the holders of a particular class of
shares are only entitled to vote on questions of a certain type, such as those where disso-
lution is imminent. The right to exercise votes at a general meeting may be granted, but
subject to the limitation that they cannot be exercised on a question involving the ap-
pointment, retirement or removal of directors. Frequently, legislation does not distin-
guish between these different voting rights, so that the spirit of legislation may be
avoided although the form is followed.
Tedeschi, supra note 32, at 522-23. See also Vagts, supra note 36, at 1531-38.
42. Tedeschi, supra note 32, at 522.
43. Assume that the cut-off point is forty-nine per cent, so that any corporation in which
a foreigner owns more than forty-nine per cent of the shares or controls more than forty-
nine per cent of the votes will be categorized as foreign. If one foreigner controls forty-
nine per cent of the share or the votes and 1,000 locals control the other fifty-one per
cent, then the corporation will be classified as domestic, even though the foreigner will
have effective control of the corporation. Therefore, the nationality of shareholders test
will not always reveal the influence which foreigners exert.
Id. at 523. See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 45-1503 (West 1968) (50 percent interest); IowA CODE
ANN. § 567.1 (West Supp. 1980) (majority interest); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-406 (1976) (majority
8
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Another test determines corporate alienage by considering the
alienage of the directors and officers." This test, however, has been
criticized as resting on unsound assumptions concerning corporate
decision-making. a
An additional method suggested to determine corporate alienage
looks "for that country which would advance a claim in an interna-
tional court or forum on the corporation's behalf. '4 6 This answer,
however, somewhat begs the question. For example, in the Barcelona
Traction Case47 the issue before the International Court of Justice was
whether Belgium had standing to assert the claims of its national share-
holders.48 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company was incorpo-
rated in Canada, doing business in Catalonia, Spain, with eighty-eight
percent of its shares owned by Belgian nationals. The World Court
stated that "in the particular field of diplomatic protection of corporate
entities, no absolute test of the 'genuine connection' has found general
acceptance."49 In deciding the standing issue, the World Court found
interest); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 22 (majority interest); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West 1980)
(corporation more than 20 percent of the stock of which is held by nonresident aliens is within
purview of restrictions).
44. Another common test relates to the identity of the corporation's directors. In Nor-
way one foreign director is sufficient to stamp the entire corporation as foreign. In Swe-
den, a corporation's status is determined by the headquarters of its board of directors.
Similarly, in Argentina and some states of the U.S. the status of a corporation depends
on the nationality of the directors.
Weisman, supra note 32, at 53-54.
45. Another method of classifying corporations is the "nationality of management" test.
This test is based on the assumption that the everyday affairs of a corporation are con-
trolled by directors or managers who are affected by ties of nationality. The test falls
down on a number of points. First, personal loyalties can be just as easily shaped by ties
of residence or domicile, which are based on a factual situation, rather than on the no-
tional dubbing of a person as a citizen. In any case, it is doubtful whether any of these
factors would significantly influence the mind of a manager so that he would put na-
tional interest above his duty to the corporation and the shareholders. Indeed, company
law in many jurisdictions obliges the manager to have primary regard to the interests of
the company as a whole, except in extreme cases involving breaches of the law or na-
tional security. The power of dismissal enables foreign owners to prevent managers
from departing to any significant extent from this duty. The test is inappropriate when
dealing with the multinational corporation where local managers' decisions can be, and
often are, overruled by the parent company. In those jurisdictions in which it is possible
for a director or manager to be a corporation, the problem arises of determining the
nationality of such a manager. Again, one must ask whether the same test should be
applied or a different one, and if so which one.
Tedeschi, supra note 32, at 523-24. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-406 (1976) (aliens cannot compose
majority of corporate board of directors).
46. Tedeschi, supra note 32, at 525.
47. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
48. "The first question which must be asked here is whether Canada . . . is, in law, the
national state of Barcelona Traction." Id. at 42-43.
49. Id. at 43.
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Canadian nationality and appeared to utilize the French concept of
siege social5" looking to Barcelona Traction's place of control and the
company's contacts with that forum.5 ' It appears that if there is doubt
concerning the nationality of a particular corporation, a preliminary
issue in an international forum is likely to be the determination of cor-
porate nationality. Thus, the circularity of reasoning entailed in this
test makes it of little guiding value.
The concept of corporate nationality "appears to have been inter-
jected more frequently" in French law "than in most other legal sys-
tems."52 French law looks to the siege social or the location of the
corporate "head office" or "business seat" to determine corporate na-
tionality. The concept of siege social is very similar, if not identical, to
the "nerve center" test utilized by American courts for determining the
principal place of business of corporations for diversity jurisdiction
purposes. 3 If it appears that strict application of the "business seat"
test would produce "a fraud upon the law" 4 then "the French courts
will look behind such designation and ascertain the real and effective
head office."55
Neither the Oklahoma statutes nor the various attorney general
opinions interpreting them provide sufficient criteria to guide a court in
identifying which corporations are subject to the restrictions and which
are not. Because of the uncertainty caused by this threshold issue, the
recent interpretation would likely have deterred investment in
50. French courts seem to have formed. . . a general test by treating the location of the
office designated by the corporation as its head (siege social) as the link between a corpo-
ration and a country which presumptively renders that country's law applicable and
which establishes for choice-of-law purposes a corporate "nationality."
Note, The Nationality of International Corporations Under CivilLaw and Treaty, 74 HARv. L. REv.
1429, 1431 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Nationality of International Corporations].
51. It has maintained in Canada its registered office, its accounts and its share registers.
Board meetings were held there for many years; it has been listed in the records of the
Canadian tax authorities. Thus a close and permanent connection has been established,
fortified by the passage of over half a century. This connection is in no way weakened
by the fact that the company engaged from the very outset in commercial activities
outside Canada, for that was its declared object.
[1970] I.C.J. Rep. at 43.
52. Nationality of International Corporations, supra note 50, at 1430.
53. Under the "nerve center" test a corporation's principal place of business is "declared to
be where the executive, personnel, advertising, public relations and other policy making depart-
ments [are] located." Note, Federal Court Diversity Jurisdiction and the Corporation, 8 TULSA L.J.
120, 126 (1972). See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 1960) (wherein
the phrase "nerve center" was first used); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Sun Leasing Co., 371 F. Supp.
1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
54. Tedeschi, supra note 32, at 524.
55. Referred to as the siege social reel et effectif. Id.
1981]
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Oklahoma even by corporations with only minimal alien contacts.
Fearing an affirmance of the Attorney General's opinion, several West-
ern European companies had, in fact, abandoned projects in
Oklahoma.56 Because the Hillcrest decision allows corporations with
alien contacts to avoid the Oklahoma restrictions simply by filing do-
mestication papers and paying a nominal fee, the issue of corporate
alienage is not likely to be litigated in Oklahoma.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment man-
dates that "[no state] shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." T5 7 Superimposed upon this language is
"[a] complex analytical structure. . creating dramatically different le-
gal approaches to equal protection questions depending on the charac-
ter of the classification involved and the nature of the private interest
being affected."5" This analytical structure has been described as
"well-settled."5 9  When considering an equal protection claim the
Court decides:
[F]irst, whether [state legislation] operates to the disadvan-
tages of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental
right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution,
thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [leg-
islative] scheme must still be examined to determine whether
it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state pur-
pose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimi-
nation.60
This approach has come to be called the "two-tier" approach to
equal protection analysis.61 The strict scrutiny of tier two is triggered if
a state law either discriminates against a suspect class62 or impinges
56. "mhe [Hillcrest] case already has stalled plans by several Western European companies
that were considering Oklahoma projects and sites." Frazier, National Sentiment Against Land
Holdings of Foreigners Strikes Chord in Oklahoma, Wall St. J., July 7, 1980, at 13, col. 3.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. Treiman, Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights - A Judicial Shell Game, 15 TULSA
L.J. 183, 183-84 (1979).
59. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,470 (1977). Contra, Trieman, supra note 58, at 184 (arguing
that in fact this framework is not well-settled).
60. 432 U.S. at 470 (quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
61. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
62. "Other than discriminations against racial and national minorities, and in some instances
against resident aliens, the Court has not been willing to identify other classifications as suspect
and subject to strict scrutiny." Treiman, supra note 58, at 193.
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upon a fundamental right.63 Application of strict scrutiny reverses the
presumption of constitutionality that accompanies state legislation 64
and requires the state to show that the classification is necessary to
achieve an overriding constitutionally permissible legislative purpose.65
In all other situations, the classification need be only rationally related
to a constitutionally permissible legislative purpose.66 This latter ap-
proach is the rational basis test or tier one scrutiny.
When dealing with a corporation, an important step in analysis
involves determination of the real party in interest. Arguably, the non-
resident alien shareholders are the burdened class.' If the situation is
viewed in this manner, with the nonresident shareholders bearing the
burdens of the legislation, the court must still determine what level of
scrutiny should be imposed on the state restrictions. Classifications
based on alienage have in recent years been subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.68 In light of this it has been suggested that, as applied to alien
individuals, Oklahoma's alien landownership statutes are unconstitu-
tional.69 Whether the protection of heightened scrutiny that has in cer-
tain instances invalidated legislation aimed at resident aliens applies to
nonresident aliens has been discussed in several state cases.
For example, in Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren,70 the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin applied only rational basis scrutiny in declaring
constitutional a Wisconsin statute7" limiting nonresident alien land-
ownership to 640 acres. Incorporated in Texas, with all of its stock
owned by nonresident West Germans, Lehndorff sought to purchase
63. Id. at 195-215.
64. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938).
65. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
66. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
67. The argument is that in the interest of considering substance over form, the court should
ignore the corporate entity and find the shareholders to be the real parties in interest.
68. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971). See also Maltz, The Burger Court and Alienage ClassNfcations, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 671
(1978).
69. When either the Oklahoma Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court is
finally faced with determining the constitutionality of the Oklahoma restrictions on alien
ownership of land, the proper level of judicial examination should be the strict scrutiny
of the "compelling governmental interest test." Under this hither standard, it is doubtful
that Oklahoma could advance an interest so compelling that it would justify the discrim-
ination present in its alien land ownership statutes. As a result, Sections 121 and 127 of
the Oklahoma Statutes would be held unconstitutional.
Oklahoma's Restrictions, supra note 15, at 151.
70. 74 Wis. 2d 369, 246 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
71. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West 1971).
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real estate in excess of 640 acres. The Wisconsin statutes determined
that a corporation was alien if twenty percent of its stock was owned by
nonresident aliens. The court did not address the equal protection
rights of the corporation, but deemed the nonresident shareholders as
the burdened party and concluded that they "do not possess the charac-
teristics which warrant heightened judicial solicitude and the state has
acted in an area traditionally within its province."72 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, however, did not address the issue of whether the pro-
tections of the Constitution extend extraterritorially.
In Johnson v. Eientrager,73 the United States Supreme Court
stated that:
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally
hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale
of rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere
lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of
safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become more
extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration
of intention to become a citizen, and they expand to those of
full citizenship upon naturalization. During his probationary
residence, this Court has steadily enlarged his right against
Executive deportation except upon full and fair hearing ...
And, at least since 1886, we have extended to the person and
property of resident aliens important constitutional guaran-
ties-such as the due process of law of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
But, in extending constitutional protections beyond the
citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was
the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave
the Judiciary power to act [to protect these constitutional
guarantees]. 74
Recently, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in denying a due
process claim of nonresident alien Mexicans, remarked that "[c]learly,
the plaintiffs are being subjected to hostile legislation, but as nonresi-
dent aliens they are beyond the protective reach of the equal protection
clause and outside of our ability to help their cause on constitutional
grounds.""5 These authorities, perhaps suggest that the nonresident
72. 74 Wis. 2d at -, 246 N.W.2d at 824.
73. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
74. Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
75. Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming Contractor, Inc., 94 N.M. 58, -, 607 P.2d 597, 600 (1980).
[Vol. 16:528
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shareholders are beyond the reach of constitutional protection.76
Dubbing the shareholders as the real parties in interest, however,
is not consistent with the status of the corporation as a separate legal
entity77 and, moreover, does not accurately reflect the nature of the re-
lationship betwen the corporation and its shareholders. Stockowners
do not own corporate assets, but rather shares which entitle them to
certain rights vis-a-vis the corporate entity.78 The restrictive Oklahoma
land legislation is aimed at the owner of the real estate and thus the
shareholder who has no right or interest in the real estate should not be
deemed the real party in interest in enforcement proceedings. The
shareholder suffers only an indirect detriment in decreased stock value
while the title holding corporate entity suffers the direct burden.79
The extent of constitutional rights possessed by a corporation is a
question the Court has yet to adequately address. 80 Corporations, over
vigorous dissent, have been determined "persons" within the meaning
76. See generally Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60
MINN. L. REv. 621, 642 (1976).
Some courts have sought to justify a distinction between resident and nonresident
aliens in the language of the fourteenth amendment, which guarantees equal protection
only to persons "within [the] jurisdiction" of the particular state. They argue that a
nonresident, not being present within the state, is not subject to its jurisdiction and there-
fore cannot claim constitutional protection. Such logic should fail even in formal terms,
because the alien is in fact being subjected to the jurisdiction by implementation of the
prohibition. Moreover, a nonresident alien admitted to the United States on a tourist
visa might personally appear in the adjudicating tribunal and thus subject himself to the
state's jurisdiction in every sense of the word.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
77. See generally Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REv. 979 (1971).
78. See Mainord v. Sharp, 569 P.2d 546 (Okla. 1977) (shareholder in corporation has no title
to corporate assets); Cooke v. Tankersley, 199 Okla. 634, 189 P.2d 417 (1948) (holding that title to
corporate assets is in the corporation and not in the shareholders); Princeton Min. Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 7 Mont. 530, 19 P. 210 (1888) (owners of corporate stock have no interest in corporate
real estate). See also Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 77-566 (1977) (deciding that because a corporation is a
legal entity distinct from its shareholders, the property of a corporation, the shares of which are
partially or wholly owned by a nonresident alien are not subject to Kentucky restrictions); Ky. Op.
Att'y Gen. 79-161 (1979) (real property owned by firm incorporated in the United States, the
shares of which are owned partially or wholly by aliens, is not subject to the Kentucky restric-
tions).
79. The World Court in the Barcelona Traction Case recognized that "a distinction must be
drawn between a direct infringement of the shareholder's rights, and difficulties or financial loses
to which he may be exposed as a result of the situation of the company." Case Concerning the
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 37. When dealing with a close cor-
poration, however, delination between corporate ownership and personal ownership, perhaps, em-
phasizes form over substance. See note 67 supra.
80. For example, recently the Court failed to address this issue in the context of the first
amendment. In First Nat'l Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Court said, "we need not
survey the outer boundaries of the Amendment's protection of corporate speech, or address the
abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy
under the First Amendment." Id. at 777.
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of the fourteenth amendment."' Because of this, after a corporation has
been classified as an alien within the purview of the Oklahoma restric-
tions, unique equal protection problems arise. Whether a corporation
enjoys the same measure of constitutional equality as an individual is
largely an open question. There is language in some older cases to the
effect that corporations may claim protection under the fourteenth
amendment to the same extent as individuals.8 2 This language, how-
ever, predates the current approach to equal protection analysis and is
probably of little value.
The recent cases involving the alien classification 83 suggest that the
characteristics which warrant strict scrutiny are individual characteris-
tics and thus, state legislative classifications involving corporations
would probably only be accorded minimal scrutiny. 4 Under the less
81. WHYY v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117, 121 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Wheeling Steel
Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Connecticut Gen. Co. v.
Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R.,
118 U.S. 394 (1886). See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
82. "A corporation which is allowed to come into a state and there carry on its business may
claim, as an individual may claim, the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against subse-
quent application to it of state law." Connecticut Gen. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 79-80 (1938).
83. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examing Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971).
84. The rights protected by the higher test in equal protection doctrine have been basic
human rights: either protection from racial and religious discrimination, as in the case of
the suspect classifications, or protection of first amendment rights, as in the fundamental
freedoms cases. Although these rights may have proprietary elements, they are not pri-
marily rights of an economic nature. Indeed, the lower-level test is sometimes impre-
cisely characterized as a test for economic and social legislation. The statutes that have
been struck down as unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of alienage adversely
affected the ability to survive-through welfare benefits, employment by the state, and
eligibility for a profession-of persons permanently residing in the United States and for
most purposes indistinguishable from American citizens. Inasmuch as land ownership
seems equally basic to such persons, as applied to them, state statutes restricting owner-
ship of land are almost certainly also unconstitutional. Many states have recognized this
by providing full or partial exemptions from their laws for resident aliens.
But what about the alien investor who is not a resident [or the alien corporation
whether resident or not] and is making an investment purely for economic motives? It is
difficult to classify his claims in the same category with a welfare claimant's bid for
medical assistance or a permanent resident's effort to enter a gainful profession. It is,
indeed, difficult to categorize his claim as one of fundamental concern. Although he is
clearly a member of a minority group, he is not part of an "isolated minority" meriting
special judicial protection, for he, unlike the permanent resident alien who has aban-
doned his homeland, can expect the diplomatic support of his national government.
Thus, despite the broad language in some of the cases, his claim may be reduced to one
judged by the "lower" constitutional standard. Under this standard, legislation restrict-
ing his ownership of land is likely to be upheld against equal protection. There is clearly
a rational relationship between the legislative classification, excluding aliens, and its os-
tensible immediate purpose, exclusion of alien influence from the state. Whether this
purpose is one that the states may legitimately pursue is a question of substantive due
process and of the exclusivity of the federal foreign relations and commerce powers ...
Morrison, supra note 76, at 642-43 (footnotes omitted).
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stringent test, "at a minimum the classification must bear a rational
relationship to [a permissible] legislative purpose.' 85
The United States Supreme Court has never specifically ruled that
state statutes which deny aliens landownership are unconstitutional.8 6
The Court, however, has not addressed the issue since 1948. In Oyama
v. California,s7 the Court struck down a law which provided that agri-
cultural land would escheat to the state whenever it was transferred
with the intention of evading California's alien landownership restric-
tions.88 The law prohibited ownership of land by an alien ineligible for
citizenship. Intent was determined by presuming that whenever the
alien provided the consideration for the transfer, evasion of the law was
the primary motive.8 9 Mr. Oyama, a resident ineligible for citizenship,
sought to transfer his land to his native American son. California ap-
plied its prohibition to this transfer. Four concurring Justices thought
the application denied Mr. Oyama equal protection of the laws.90 The
majority, however, held that the son's rights were violated because the
classification was one of national origin and thus subject to strict scru-
tiny.9' The majority did not reach the question of the father's equal
protection rights.92
In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission," the Court invalidated
a California statute94 which denied aliens commercial fishing licenses.
In support of its legislation, California cited older cases which had up-
held state restrictions on alien landownership. 95 Justice Black, writing
85. Treiman, supra note 58, at 187. "The Court in several cases has declared certain purposes
to be constitutionally impermissible, despite their possible importance. Deferring in-migration of
indigents is an impermissible purpose. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969). Racial
discrimination or segregation, for its own sake is constitutionally impermissible. [In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 722 n.8 (1973).]" Treiman, supra note 58, at 187 n.22. The arguable purpose of this
legislation is to restrict alien landownership because it is "within the realm of possibility that every
foot of land within the state might pass to the ownership or possession of non-citizens." Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220-21 (1923). See generally Weisman, supra note 32, at 42-48 (catalog-
ing seven grounds for restricting alien acquisition of land).
86. In fact, a group of 1923 cases upheld state restrictions on alien landownership. Frick v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S.
225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
87. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
88. CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 261 (Deering 1944, Supp. 1945) (repealed 1956) (found in 332
U.S. at 635).
89. 332 U.S. at 636.
90. Id. at 647, 650 (Black & Douglas, J.J., concurring; Murphy & Rutledge, J.J., concurring).
91. Id. at 640.
92. Id. at 647.
93. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
94. Id. at 413.
95. Id. at 422 & n.8.
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for the majority, questioned the "continued validity of those cases" and
decided they were not controlling since they "were supported on rea-
sons peculiar to real property. '9 6 He determined that any alleged pro-
prietary interest of California in the fish off its coast was a "slender
reed" on which to base the classification.
Oyama and Takahashi are the last word from the Supreme Court
regarding state laws barring alien landownership. The decisions are
over thirty years old and neither resolves the issue.
V. TREATIES
Treaties made under the authority of the United States are the
supreme law of the land, are binding on the states, and override incon-
sistent state legislation.97 Application of the Oklahoma restrictions to
corporations, in certain situations, might contravene provisions in com-
mercial treaties entered into by the United States. To the extent that
the Oklahoma statutes are inconsistent with rights granted under a
treaty of the United States they are unenforceable.
Treaties are similar to a contract between separate sovereign na-
tions.98 Because of the nature of the parties, however, some of the con-
cepts involved in contract law are perhaps inapplicable regarding
treaties.99 Since treaties are binding only upon the signatories, each
application of the Oklahoma restrictions would potentially raise differ-
ent treaty rights. The United States, however, has entered into a genre
of treaties generally known as treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation or "FCN" treaties.' 0° Many of the provisions in these
96. Id. at 422.
97. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880);
Detenorio v. Lightsey, 589 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1979). See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
98. H. STEINER & D. vAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 281-82 (2d ed. 1976).
99. For example, in the past, the concepts of overreaching and duress, which are contract
defenses were not recognized regarding treaties.
The traditional rule did not invalidate a treaty because of the use of any force against a
state in the treaty's conclusion. International law did not permit a denunciation of a
treaty for the reason that it was imposed. The actual consent of states was not required
in the creation of binding international agreements.
Malawer, Imposed Treaties and International Law, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 5, 164 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United States-
Israel, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, April 2,
1953, United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Japanese Treaty];
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, 8
U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
United States-West Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 [hereinafter cited as West German
treaty]. See generally Morrison, supra note 76, at 658-59 n.n. 225 & 226 (citing 40 treaties of
friendship, commerce, and navigation); see also Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States
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17
Kuzow: Corporate Aliens and Oklahoma's Alien Landownership Restrictions
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
CORPORA TE ALIEN LANDO WNERSHIP
treaties are similar, if not identical.
In Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren,'0 ' Lehndorff Geneva argued
that the restrictive Wisconsin legislation "denies rights granted to it
under a 'Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation' (FCN) be-
tween the United States and West Germany and is therefore unconsti-
tutional under Article VI, United States Constitution."' °2  The
Wisconsin Supreme Court considered article VII of the treaty. "Each
party reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may establish,
acquire interests in, or carry on enterprises engaged within its territo-
ries in communications, air or water transport, taking and administer-
ing trusts, banking involving depository functions, or the exploitation
of land or other natural resources .. " I3 The court decided that the
authority to limit "exploitation of land" authorized "restrictions on the
use of land not applicable to nationals," and by implication allowed
restrictions on alien landowriership.' 0
The implications of Lehndorff Geneva's Texas incorporation were
never discussed in the case. Arguably, the treaty between the United
States and West Germany required recognition of Lebndorff Geneva's
Texas incorporation thereby rendering it an American national and not
subject to the restrictions imposed by the Wisconsin legislation. The
treaty's definitional section requires that "[c]ompanies constituted
under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of ei-
ther Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their judi-
cial status recognized within the territories of the other party."10 5 Thus,
the treaty between the United States and West Germany apparently
requires application of the place of incorporation test of corporate na-
tionality. An identical provision has been so interpreted in two recent
cases concerning the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navi-
gation between the United States and Japan.10 6
In Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. ,107 defendant Itoh-America argued that
the 1953 treaty provided American subsidiaries of Japanese corpora-
Commercial Treaties, 50 AMER. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956); Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958).
101. 74 Wis.2d 369, 246 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
102. Id. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 818 (footnotes omitted). See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
103. 74 Wis. 2d at-, 246 N.W.2d at 818. (quoting West German Treaty, supra note 100, art.
VII, 'ara. 2).
104. 74 Wis. 2d at -, 246 N.W.2d at 819.
105. West German Treaty, supra note 100, art. XXV, para. 5.
106. Japanese Treaty, supra note 100, art. XXII, para. 3.
107. 469 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
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tions an absolute right to hire managerial, professional and other spe-
cialized personnel "irrespective of American law proscribing racial
discrimination in employment."'' 10 The United States District Court
decided that it need not reach this issue since defendant Itoh-America
had no standing to raise rights granted under the treaty. The court
arrived at this conclusion by looking to the treaty's definitional sec-
tion, ' 9 which requires recognition of the "juridical status" of compa-
nies formed by Japanese citizens under American law.1° The court
concluded, "[gjiven the Treaty's own definitional terms, Itoh-America
is a company of the United States for purposes of the interpretation of
Article VIII(l). Thus, it can claim no direct protection under Article
VIII(l), which applies only to companies of one party within the terri-
tories of the other party."'
Thus, for the purposes of the treaty at least, corporate nationality
is determined by place of incorporation. Itoh-America then, because
incorporated in New York, was an American company. Since Ameri-
can companies had no standing to raise rights granted under the treaty,
Itoh-America had no standing to raise the treaty as a defense to its
discriminatory hiring practices.
In Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.' 2 the issue raised
was identical to that in Spiess. A United States District Court was
asked to decide whether Sumitomo could "invoke the aegis of the
Treaty as sanction for its employment practices. ' 3 The court, relying
on Spiess and an older interpretation of the 1953 Japanese-American
Treaty in United States v. R.'. Oldham," 4 decided that "Sumitomo is a
domestic corporation and as such has neither standing nor need to in-
voke the aegis of the Treaty.""'
Both of these decisions were made in the face of an opinion letter
by the Department of State" 6 urging a contrary interpretation of the
treaty. The State Department saw "no grounds for distinguishing be-
108. Id. at 2. See Japanese Treaty, supra note 100, art. VIII, para. 1.
109. Japanese Treaty, supra note 100, art. XXII. "Companies constituted under the applicable
laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and
shall have their juridical status recognized within the territories of the other Party." Id. para. 5.
110. 469 F. Supp. at 2.
I1. Id. at 9.
112. 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
113. Id. at 509.
114. 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
115. 473 F. Supp. at 513.
116. Letter from Lee R. Marks, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State to Abner W.
Sibal, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (October 17, 1978).
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tween subsidiaries incorporated in the United States owned and con-
trolled by a Japanese company and those operating as unincorporated
branches of a Japanese company, nor do we see any policy reason for
making the applicability of Article VIII dependent on choice of organi-
zational form."'1 7 Although interpretations of treaty construction by
the executive branch should be accorded great weight,1 8 because the
State Department failed to support its position with "analysis or rea-
soning" 19 and because the opinion letter failed to consider the defini-
tional section of the treaty, both courts concluded that the Department
of State opinion letter did not warrant a different result.
20
These cases probably do not suggest that treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation require Oklahoma to recognize the place of
incorporation as the test for corporate nationality. They do suggest
that the test of corporate nationality applied depends upon the purpose
for which a designation of corporate nationality is being sought. The
Spiess and Sumitomo cases determine that for purposes of standing
under FCN treaties, place of incorporation is the test. For other pur-
poses, however, different tests may apply.
For "treaty-trader" purposes the test of corporate nationality is
different. Many of the various FCN treaties have provisions authoriz-
ing nationals of the particular signatory to enter the United States as
treaty-traders "for the purpose of carrying on trade between the two
Parties and engaging in related commercial activities .... ,",21 In or-
der to qualify for such status the potential treaty-trader's employer
must have the nationality of the treaty country, or be principally owned
by individuals having the nationality of the treaty country. 22 The De-
partment of State has issued guidelines to this regulation providing that
"[t]he nationality of the employing firm is determined by those persons
who own more than 50% of the stock of the employing corporation
'regardless of place of incorporation.' "12 Adoption of the treaty-
trader test was urged on the courts in both Spiess and Sumitomo. Both
courts declined to adopt that test. "The fact that nationality is deter-
mined by a different standard for other purposes cannot alter the
117. 473 F. Supp. at 511.
118. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1960).
119. 473 F. Supp. at 511.
120. Id. at 511-12 & n.12.
121. West German Treaty, supra note 100, art. II, para. 1.
122. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 (1980).
123. 469 F. Supp. at 6.
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clearly stated test of the treaty itself."' 2 4
There appears to be no restriction upon the states in these treaties
requiring adoption of a particular test of corporate nationality. When
applying their alien landownership restrictions to corporate entities the
states appear free, for the purpose of that legislation, to adopt whatever
test of corporate nationality they desire.
Another feature of these treaties, however, may be important.
Many of them grant what has come to be known as most favored na-
tion status. This status requires that alien nationals of the foreign sig-
natory be granted the most favorable treatment afforded any alien in
the United States.'25 If the United States confers, by treaty, or execu-
tive agreement, most favored nation status on nation A, then nationals
of A are entitled to the same panoply of rights granted nationals of
nations X, Y, and Z combined. This formula might have important
implications in certain instances. The key to this argument is that nd-
tionals of Argentina are entitled under an 1853 treaty with the United
States to acquire "property of every sort and determination."'' 26 The
1853 treaty thus appears to confer upon Argentine nationals the right to
own real estate in the United States, a right which must also be granted
to holders of most favored nation status.
This loophole, however, is probably of limited application. Often
the conference of most favored nation status is limited to specific mat-
ters. For instance, a typical clause will grant most favored nation treat-
ment in matters of commerce. 27 Arguably, implicit in these clauses is
the right to own land if it is necessary to carry on commerce. The fact,
however, that most treaties explicitly recognize a state's right to restrict
alien ownership of real property undermines this argument. 128 Thus,
only in situations where most favored nation status is conferred across-
the-board will the right of landownership granted Argentine nationals
come into play.
124. Id.; 473 F. Supp. at 512.
125. See Morrison, supra note 76, at 660.
126. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, July 27, 1853, United States-Argen-
tina, art. IX, 10 STAT. 1005, T.S. No. 5.
127. See Note, The Rising Tide of Reverse Flow- Would a Legislative Breakwater Violate U.S.
Treaty Commitments?, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 551, 576 & n.97 (1974).
128. "The term 'commerce' is not defined, but the scope of the items expressly covered (eg.
tariffs, entry of ships into harbors, and commercial travelers) indicates that 'commerce' refers prin-
cipally to matters of trade between the signatory nations, and not to investment involving stock
ownership [or landownership]." Id. at 576 & n.98.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Without addressing many of the issues potentially raised, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has effectively nullified the Oklahoma re-
strictions as they pertain to corporate aliens. This comment has ad-
dressed the most prominent issues left unresolved in the Hillcrest
decision in the context of the recent Oklahoma developments. De-
pending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case and the
particular state legislation and federal treaty involved, different issues
are potentially raised.
As foreign investment in the United States increases, 29 the issue of
alien landownership, both corporate and individual, will increasingly
be before the courts. Though probably economically unwise and prac-
tically unenforceable, state restrictions on alien landownership as ap-
plied to corporate aliens neither violate the Constitution of the United
State nor, in most applications, rights conferred by federal treaty.
Michael Kuzow
129. Id. at 551-52 & n.3.
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